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Abstract
In this paper we study decision making in situations where the individual’s preferences are
not assumed to be complete. First, we identify conditions that are necessary and sufficient for
choice behavior in general domains to be consistent with maximization of a possibly incomplete
preference relation. In this model of maximally dominant choice, the agent defers/avoids choosing
at those and only those menus where a most preferred option does not exist. This allows for
simple explanations of conflict-induced deferral and choice overload. It also suggests a criterion
for distinguishing between indifference and incomparability based on observable data. A simple
extension of this model also incorporates decision costs and provides a theoretical framework
that is compatible with the experimental design that we propose to elicit possibly incomplete
preferences in the lab. The design builds on the introduction of monetary costs that induce
choice of a most preferred feasible option if one exists and deferral otherwise. Based on this
design we found evidence suggesting that a quarter of the subjects in our study had incomplete
preferences, and that these made significantly more consistent choices than a group of subjects
who were forced to choose. The latter effect, however, is mitigated once data on indifferences are
accounted for.
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1 Introduction
This paper provides a theoretical and empirical investigation of decision making in
situations where preferences are not assumed to be complete. Completeness requires
that whenever an agent is presented with any two choice alternatives, either she prefers
one over the other or she is indifferent between them. As such, it rules out the
possibility of the agent being indecisive between two options in the sense of being
unable to compare them. While completeness is often considered to be a rationality
condition on preferences alongside transitivity, the above behavioral restriction of the
axiom has rendered it vulnerable to criticism on both normative and positive grounds
by, among others, von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), Savage (1954), Aumann
(1962) and Gilboa, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Schmeidler (2010).
With regard to the descriptive relevance of completeness, intuition as well as a
sizeable body of experimental evidence suggest two main reasons this axiom could be
violated. In Sen’s (1997) words, “incompleteness can arise from limited information,
or from ‘unresolved’ value conflicts”. The adverse role of value conflicts on the abil-
ity of agents to compare alternatives has been discussed by philosophers (e.g. Levi,
1986), while extensive evidence for it (in the form of responses to hypothetical choice
questionnaires) has also been documented in the consumer psychology and marketing
research literatures through the identification of a robust link between such conflicts
in decisions among multi-attribute alternatives and the ensuing avoidant/deferring
behavior of the agents in menus that include such alternatives. As Shafir, Simonson,
and Tversky (1993) described this phenomenon, “there are situations in which people
(...) do not have a compelling reason for choosing among the alternatives and, as a
result, defer the decision, perhaps indefinitely.”
Intuition and experimental evidence also suggest that the incidence of incomplete-
ness is more likely in situations where the decision maker has inadequate information
about the alternatives in question and also that, in such cases, she would be willing to
acquire more information about them in order to resolve indecisiveness. Some studies
by psychologists that have lent support to this hypothesis are Ferrari and Dovidio
(2001) and Rassin, Muris, Booster, and Kolsloot (2008). These works showed that
individuals with high scores in indecisiveness personality questionnaires were signif-
icantly more likely to delay making a decision and to seek additional information,
especially about the alternative they ultimately chose.
With regard to the normative status of completeness, perhaps the main argument
in favour of such a status is based on the fact that abidance by this axiom is neces-
sary for behaviour to be as if it has been generated by utility maximization. Since
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the work of Samuelson (1938), Houthakker (1950) and Afriat (1967) in neoclassical
demand theory and the work of Arrow (1959) and Richter (1966) in general choice
theory, utility-maximizing behaviour in various contexts is considered to be directly
testable via (some variant of) the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP). How-
ever, if WARP consistency is accepted as the behavioural hallmark of any theory of
rational choice, then the argument for including the completeness axiom in the set of
properties that define rational preferences would be substantially weakened if it could
be demonstrated that agents with incomplete preferences can somehow still make fully
WARP-consistent choices by following a suitable decision rule.
Our first contribution in the present paper is theoretical and addresses this last
point. Specifically, we identify conditions under which it is possible for an individual
with incomplete preferences to be a fully consistent preference maximizer who makes
choices that satisfy WARP. It is well-known (Sen, 1971; Schwartz, 1976) that if such
preferences are maximized in the sense that one of the undominated (non-inferior) op-
tions is always chosen, then the resulting behavior is generally not WARP-consistent.
We demonstrate that full WARP consistency is possible when the decision maker
chooses only a most preferred alternative whenever some such feasible alternative ex-
ists and defers/avoids choice whenever such an alternative cannot be found. We refer
to this decision rule as the Maximally Dominant Choice (MDC) procedure. It is char-
acterized by four intuitive axioms and reduces to rational choice when preferences are
complete or, equivalently, when the agent never defers at any menu.
The MDC model is descriptively relevant when it comes to explaining the above
mentioned observations of incompleteness-induced deferral. In addition, it offers an
indecisiveness-based explanation of the choice-overload effect (Iyengar and Lepper,
2000) as well as of when this effect breaks down. Choice overload refers to the ob-
servation that decision makers defer more frequently when faced with large menus of
alternatives than when presented with smaller menus. One of the explanations that
have already been suggested for its occurrence is the frequent lack of a clearly supe-
rior option in such menus (Iyengar and Lepper, 2000). Subsequent works, however,
demonstrated that introducing such a superior option in large menus at which sub-
jects had deferred does in fact lead them to choose that option in the expanded menu
(see Scheibenhenne, Greifeneder, and Todd (2010) and references therein). Both these
behavioural patterns are predicted by the MDC model. Moreover, to our knowledge
this is the first model to provide a formal explanation of both the occurrence and
the disappearance of the choice overload effect in a way that relates this behavior to
incomplete preferences.
Importantly, the MDC model also suggests a theoretical distinction between the
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psychological notions of indifference and incomparability/indecisiveness that relies
only on observable behavior. Specifically, under the sole assumption that choice data
have been generated by this procedure, and without the need for any additional struc-
tural restrictions on preferences, an outside observer can infer that the agent is indeci-
sive between two options if and only if none of them is ever chosen in the presence of
the other. In contrast, the observer can conclude that the agent is indifferent between
two options x and y if whenever x is choosable and y is feasible, then y is also choos-
able. The above condition for inferring incomparability is novel and complements the
ones that were recently proposed by Eliaz and Ok (2006) and Mandler (2009) and
which are based on a WARP violation and on a transitivity violation, respectively.
Despite the fact that it is consistent with WARP, a point that could be raised
against the rationality of the behavior that is predicted by the MDC model is that, by
deferring due to indecisiveness even though she finds all feasible alternatives desirable,
the agent is effectively subscribing to inefficient behavior. Therefore, at first sight it
would appear that a consistency vs efficiency trade-off comes about for an agent who
adheres to this cautious decision rule. However, we claim that this argument ignores
potentially important psychological factors such as the cost of regret that can occur
once a choice is made from a menu where a most preferred option does not exist.
When only one alternative is feasible, this possibility is ruled out by definition. Yet,
when more than a single alternative is feasible and the agent is unable to find a most
preferred item among them, the likelihood of regret if a choice is made is often severe
enough to lead to choice deferral (see also Reb (2008) on this point).
The preceding discussion begs the question of whether the behavior that is captured
by the MDC model can be considered rational once such psychological considerations
are taken into account. To answer this question, we first recall two distinct definitions
of rationality that are influential among economic theorists. According to Bewley
(2002), “a person is defined to be rational (...) if he does the best he can, using
reason and all available information, to further his own interests and values”. In
addition, according to Gilboa (2010), “a mode of behavior is rational for a given
person if this person feels comfortable with it, and is not embarrassed by it, even when
it is analyzed for him.” One may argue then that, depending on the decision maker
and her individual characteristics and overall psychological profile and priorities, both
definitions of rationality can be compatible with deferring behavior even when this
occurs at the expense of foregoing alternatives that are otherwise desirable. To allow
for a more active role of such procedural considerations in the decision making process,
we enrich the MDC model by introducing a psychological decision cost function that
has certain intuitive properties. We show by example that such a function exists and
then discuss its effects on the predictions of the model.
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Following this analysis, the paper’s focus takes a methodological and empirical turn.
First, as a step forward towards a solution to the long-standing problem of identifying
whether an individual’s preferences are complete or not in an incentive-compatible way,
we propose a novel experimental design, applicable in a general choice context, which
truthfully elicits their preferences even when these are incomplete, provided that cer-
tain conditions are satisfied. Specifically, in the spirit of our model, and consistent with
the evidence on incompleteness-induced choice deferral that were mentioned above, the
proposed design attempts to recover incompleteness by introducing incentives for sub-
jects to defer choice from those and only those menus (binary as well as non-binary) in
which they cannot find a weakly most preferred option, and to choose such an option
from all other menus.
In particular, the design’s incentives build on the limited-information explanation
of preference incompleteness as well as on the possibility of regret following choice in
the absence of a most preferred option that were discussed above. In the experiment,
subjects are offered the opportunity to defer choice at a positive expected cost and
to obtain potentially more information about the alternatives in one of the previously
presented menus (selected randomly). The potentially additional information was
obtained by way of inspection and trial of the items (which in our case were headphone
sets) in this menu. The chance to inspect the items in their randomly selected menu
was given to the subjects regardless of whether they had originally deferred at this
menu or not. Importantly, however, the design also allowed subjects to change the
choice they had made at their randomly selected menu after the inspection phase, but
at a higher expected cost.
We discuss in detail the conditions under which this structure makes truthful pref-
erence revelation incentive-compatible. The general idea, however, is probably already
clear: a) subjects who can’t find a most preferred option in a menu would be willing
to defer choice at a small expected cost in order to have the opportunity to obtain ad-
ditional and potentially useful information that could enable them to ultimately find
such an option; b) subjects would not be willing to choose at random from a menu
in which a most preferred option does not exist because in the likely event that they
would change their mind after inspecting the items, they would have to incur a higher
cost in order to modify their choice than the one they would have incurred had they
deferred.
We note that although the MDC model is silent about costs and procedural con-
siderations, the enriched procedural model mentioned above, with its inclusion of
psychological costs into the analysis, directly rationalizes the behaviour that our de-
sign intends to capture. Nevertheless, we also formally acknowledge the possibility
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of interpreting deferral in the context of our design as being derived by a subjective
expected utility maximization process, whereby subjects have a prior belief about a
possible modifying effect that the (potentially) additional information will have on
their current weakly ordered preferences, and decide whether to defer or not on the
basis of which one of these two acts yields a higher expected utility. While we acknowl-
edge the possibility of this interpretation, we also discuss our reservations regarding
its relevance in our setting.
Finally, we used the data from our experiment to answer the following empirical
question: If subjects’ preferences are incomplete, does an experimental design that
always forces them to choose also make them more vulnerable to inconsistencies in
comparison to a design that does not? To our knowledge, this question had not been
raised before, despite an argument going back to at least Luce and Raiffa (1957) on
the role of incompleteness in the occurrence of cyclical binary choices, according to
which “intransitivities often occur when a subject forces choices between inherently
incomparable alternatives” (p.25). The question is obviously of great importance to
economists and psychologists who conduct choice experiments, given the predominant
role of forced-choice designs in most such disciplines. If there is evidence suggesting
that the answer to this question is “yes”, then this would call for a reconsideration
of this method, as it would have been proved vulnerable to biases towards reporting
irrational behaviour that would be attributed to either intransitivity or instability of
preferences, when the culprit would actually be incompleteness. On the other hand,
if the answer to the question is “no”, then this would be a reassuring finding in that
it would demonstrate the robustness of forced-choice designs after a vigorous test.
Based on a combination of choice and questionnaire data, we find evidence of incom-
plete preferences in approximately 25% of the subjects. This figure is within the range
of conflict-induced deferral rates that have been reported in the consumer psychology
literature. With regard to the last question on choice consistency, our empirical ap-
proach to answering it is based on comparing the total number of WARP violations
in the datasets of subjects participating in the non-forced choice treatment to those
participating in a forced-choice (control) treatment. The latter followed closely the
structure of the former treatment except that the possibility of choice deferral was not
available to those subjects. We find that the answer to this question depends crucially
on whether subjects’ indifference statements are incorporated or not. If not, then we
find that subjects assigned to the forced-choice treatment exhibit significantly lower
consistency than those assigned to the target treatment. The effect, however, is no
longer significant when indifference statements are included in the analysis. Finally,
using the indecisiveness personality questionnaire that was suggested in Germeijs and
Boeck (2002), we find that in the forced-choice treatment, subjects with a high indeci-
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siveness personality score were less consistent than subjects with a low score, but that
this difference disappeared in the target treatment.
2 Related Literature
Theories of general or abstract choice with incomplete preferences (as opposed to pref-
erence representation theorems) goes back to at least Sen (1971) and Schwartz (1976),
where the benchmark model that is based on choice of an undominated option was
studied axiomatically with varying degrees of structure on the (strict) preference re-
lation. This model was further studied in Bossert, Sprumont, and Suzumura (2005)
without the assumption that all choice observations in the relevant domain are avail-
able. Eliaz and Ok (2006) analyzed the case where the preference relation was allowed
to be weak and suggested a criterion for distinguishing between the notions of indif-
ference and incomparability based on observable behavior. Another criterion for that
purpose was proposed in Mandler (2009); both of them are discussed in Section 3.3.
The perils associated with choosing randomly when preferences are incomplete and the
possibility of the agent being exploited in a money-pump style when this is the case
were studied in Danan (2010). As far as welfare analysis is concerned, an incomplete
and generally acyclic binary relation was proposed in Bernheim and Rangel (2009) as
the basis for inferring a decision maker’s true preferences from her choices when these
are not generally derived by utility maximization, which coincides with the standard
revealed preference relation when the latter is the case.
Despite the flourishing choice-theoretic literature on status quo bias that has fol-
lowed Bewley (2002), Mandler (2004) and especially Masatlioglu and Ok (2005), and
despite, in particular, Dean (2008) (discussed further below) where theoretical and
empirical connections were provided between incomplete preferences and status quo
bias in large menus in the spirit of the choice overload effect, the choice-theoretic lit-
erature that relates incompleteness and choice deferral is currently very limited. To
our knowledge, apart from Gerasimou (2014) where a specific behavioral model is
provided, references to the possibility and intuitive appeal of such a connection were
made in Hurwicz (1986) and Clark (1995). However, studies that focus on choice de-
ferral that is rooted elsewhere, such as in procedural considerations or in the agent’s
preference for flexibility a` la Kreps (1979) and Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (2001)
include Gaertner and Xu (2004), Manzini and Mariotti (2014), Kochov (2010) and
Buturak and Evren (2014).
In particular, Buturak and Evren (2014) model an agent who is faced with the
problem of choosing or deferring when presented with menus of lotteries, with deferral
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captured by an explicit non-lottery option. The agent is portrayed as being uncer-
tain about which expected-utility preferences she will have in the future, as using a
utility-minus-regret function that measures the difference between a lottery’s expected
utility and the maximum achievable one in a given menu under fixed preferences, and
also as having a prior belief on the set of all expected utility preferences that may
apply to her. Moreover, the agent is modelled as choosing a lottery from a menu if
and only if its expected utility-minus-regret, weighted according to this prior belief,
exceeds the constant value associated with the regret-free option of deferral. The
model is intimately related to the representation in Sarver (2008), but identifies nec-
essary and sufficient conditions on choices rather than on preferences and also allows
for a link between choice deferral and regret aversion to be established. The resulting
model features context-dependent choices which are compatible with choice overload,
as the regret associated with every lottery is increasing in the size of a menu. In our
model, choices are context-independent and, as already mentioned, also compatible
with choice-overload observations. Also, unlike Buturak and Evren (2014), we study
choice and deferral in a very general domain.1
In the domain of uncertain (Anscombe-Aumann) acts, Kopylov (2009) studied one
incomplete “firm” preference relation and one that is complete and ambiguity averse.
It was shown that certain axioms on these relations characterize their joint represen-
tation by means of a common set of priors over the states of the world as well as
the unanimity and (a variant of the) maxmin rule, respectively. An informal choice-
theoretic interpretation of this preference representation theorem suggested in Kopylov
(2009) was that an agent abiding by this rule defers whenever she cannot find an act
that is most preferred according to the former relation and her choice can be deferred,
and she chooses the most preferred act according to the latter relation whenever choice
cannot be deferred.
Turning to the experimental evidence for choice deferral that is driven by decision
conflict, such evidence was first reported in Tversky and Shafir (1992) and later also in
Dhar (1997), Luce (1998) and Dhar and Simonson (2003), among others. These studies
employed the methodology of hypothetical-choice questionnaires and reported deferral
frequencies that typically ranged between 20% and 45%. Anderson (2003) surveyed
the relevant literature on conflict-induced deferral and associated its occurrence with
1In the domain of menus of lotteries, Danan, Guerdjikova, and Zimper (2012) provided a representation theorem of
(complete) preferences over such menus in which the agent’s ex post tastes have a stable but incomplete component and
a number of possible completions. The agent is modelled as comparing menus by aggregating the minimum expected
utilities associated with each relevant completion of her stable preferences across the undominated lotteries in that
menu. In this model, the agent exhibits preference for commitment in the sense that she prefers menus with fewer
undominated options. On the other hand, Pejsachowicz and Toussaert (2013) analyzed a model that builds on two
preference relations over menus of lotteries and imposed axioms that connect these two relations in such a way that if
the first is incomplete, then the second (its completion) must exhibit preference for flexibility, i.e. preference for larger
menus. By taking preferences rather than choices as primitives, however, these papers abstract from modelling choice
deferral.
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the individuals’ attempts to avoid negative emotions such as regret that are often
generated in the face of hard decision problems (see also Luce (1998) on this point).
That paper also placed the effect in the broader class of decision-avoidant phenomena
which also includes status quo bias (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988).
As discussed in Gerasimou (2014), unlike decision problems where the status quo
takes the form of a physical option just like all others and in which avoidant behavior
is associated with status quo bias, avoidance in problems where choice deferral is the
relevant phenomenon maybe thought of as being associated with choosing nothing and
not with retaining some explicit feasible option. For example, avoidant behavior in
the problem of choosing between three insurance contracts when already endowed with
one of them translates into status quo bias, whereas decision avoidance when the same
problem is presented but without any of the contracts being the status quo option
translates into choice deferral. Gerasimou (2014) proposes an incompleteness-based
model that accounts for both phenomena and provides a formal theoretical distinction
between them.
With regard to the relevant experimental literature, unlike the studies that were
mentioned above in which subjects were allowed not to choose any option, the in-
centivized experimental design proposed in Danan and Ziegelmeyer (2006) followed a
different approach that aimed to test the completeness axiom in the domain of money
lotteries. Specifically, in the first session (week 1) subjects were presented with the
problem of choosing between a menu that contained a risky lottery as well as a cer-
tain amount and a degenerate menu consisting of either the lottery or the certain
amount. In the final session (week 2), and without receiving any additional informa-
tion about the alternative since the first session, subjects were asked to choose from
within the menus (where applicable) that they had chosen the week before. Danan
and Ziegelmeyer (2006) found that a high proportion of the subjects chose the non-
degenerate menu that included both options, which they interpreted as evidence for
incompleteness. It could be argued, however, that the structure of the experimental
design and the reported findings in their study appear to be closer to a positive test
for preference for flexibility.
3 Incomparability, Deferral and Revealed Preference
3.1 The Baseline Model
The set of all possible choice alternatives is X and is assumed finite. The set M
denotes the collection of all nonempty subsets of X, which will be called menus. A
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choice correspondence C : M ։ X is a possibly multi-valued mapping that satisfies
C(A) ⊆ A for all A ∈ M and associates every menu with the alternatives that the
decision maker may choose from this menu. Typically, the following is also taken to
be a defining property of a choice correspondence:
A0 (Decisiveness)
If A ∈M, then C(A) 6= ∅.
One notes, however, that the above primitive definition of a choice correspondence
clearly allows for C to be empty-valued. In view of this, and also because nonempty-
valuedness assumes that the decision maker is always able to choose something from
every menu, which in turn is a non-trivial restriction on behavior, in this paper we
treat this property as an explicit behavioral axiom.2
When deferral is due to incompleteness and not some other reason such as unattrac-
tiveness of the alternatives, a conceptual argument in favor of this approach and against
the one that relies on an explicit and always feasible “no-choice” option is provided in
Gerasimou (2014). In particular, suppose d stands for the “no-choice” option which
is always feasible, and let w, x, y and z be four “real” options. Suppose also that the
individual cannot compare x and y and hence defers choice when these are the only
“real” options available. In this case, d is chosen over both x and y. If the individual
prefers x to both w and z, however, she chooses x from the menu {x, w, z; d}. In
particular, here x is chosen over d. Therefore, with this modelling approach the above
behavior should lead one to the conclusion that the decision maker violates WARP
(defined below), although she is simply maximizing her preferences in the second menu
and is cautiously avoiding choice in the absence of a preference comparison in the first
menu. Hence, the conclusion of irrationality in cases such as this is presumably too
strong. It stems from the fact that the no-choice option d is treated just like every
other alternative, even though when the individual actually chooses it, she doesn’t do
so because she prefers it to the other feasible ones, as is the case with avoidance caused
by unattractiveness.
A1 (WARP)
If x ∈ C(A), y ∈ A \ C(A) and y ∈ C(B), then x 6∈ B.
When Decisiveness is also assumed, WARP can be written in a number of equivalent
ways. Without it, however, such equivalences are no longer valid. The statement of
2This approach to modelling incompleteness-driven deferral has also been discussed recently in Kreps (2012).
9
WARP that was given above is in the spirit of Samuelson’s (1938) original version of
the axiom that was formulated in the context of choice from competitive budget sets:
If an alternative x is chosen over some other alternative y in some menu, then there is
no menu where y is choosable and x is feasible. The axiom’s status as the core princi-
ple of choice consistency remains intact (if not strengthened) in an environment where
deferral is permissible. Intuitively, when the decision maker chooses x over y from a
menu A even though she had the opportunity to choose nothing, in general this may
be a stronger indication that x is preferred to y relative to the case where choice from
A was forced. To the extent that this is so, it becomes even more plausible to expect
that a rational decision maker will not choose y from any menu where x is also feasible.
A2 (Desirability)
If x ∈ X, then C({x}) = {x}.
The Desirability axiom is compatible with the interpretation that whenever the deci-
sion maker is faced with only one alternative, the latter is sufficiently good for him
to choose it. As such, the axiom rules out unattractiveness of the alternatives as a
potential reason for choice deferral. To our knowledge, the only experimental evidence
directly relevant to this axiom is provided in Zakay (1984) and Mochon (2013). The
first paper found support to the hypothesis that choice behavior in the face of a single
feasible option depends on “how far” this option is, in terms of attractiveness, from
the subject’s best among all possible ones. The second paper documents a general
aversion to choice from singleton menus even when the alternative in question is at-
tractive. Mochon argues that this phenomenon appears to be driven by the decision
makers’ increased desire to continue searching whenever they are faced with a single
option, and finds that if such behavior is observed at singleton menus, it is often seen
later as well, even in non-singleton menus. Despite the concern on descriptive grounds
that is raised by this finding that even when alternatives are actually desirable they
are sometimes not chosen when they are alone in a menu, A2 is a normatively appeal-
ing axiom in such a context and is known from other work (Zakay (1984) as well as
Tversky and Shafir (1992); see below) to have some descriptive relevance too.
A3 (Contraction Consistency)
If x ∈ C(A), B ⊂ A and x ∈ B, then x ∈ C(B).
Contraction Consistency (also known as “Property α” or “Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives”) is a standard axiom. It is weaker than WARP when Decisiveness is also
10
in force, but logically distinct from it otherwise. Indeed, if Decisiveness is not assumed
it is generally possible to find a menu A and an alternative x ∈ A such that x ∈ C(A),
x ∈ B ⊂ A and C(B) = ∅, in violation of Contraction Consistency but not in violation
of WARP. However, ruling out this kind of behavior is normatively appealing. Indeed,
if the fact that x is chosen from A suggests that x is at least as good as every other
alternative in A, then this is also true of all alternatives in submenu B. Therefore,
to allow for the possibility that nothing is chosen from B amounts to saying that the
most preferred option in the menu is not chosen, which is obviously against what a
rational decision maker would do.
A4 (Strong Expansion)
If x ∈ C(A), y ∈ A and y ∈ C(B), then x ∈ C(A ∪ B).
To our knowledge, Strong Expansion is a novel axiom. Similar to A3, it is implied
by WARP when Decisiveness is assumed and is distinct from WARP otherwise. It
strengthens the well-known “Expansion” or “Property γ” axiom, which states that an
alternative x that is choosable in both A and B is also choosable in A∪B. Indeed, the
proposed axiom requires that if x is chosen in the presence of y in some menu A and
y is chosen in B, then x is chosen in A ∪ B. This obviously reduces to Expansion in
the special case where x = y. As far as intuition for the axiom is concerned, one notes
that, for a rational decision maker, the fact that x is chosen in the presence of y at
menu A suggests that x is at least as good as y and everything else in A. Likewise, the
fact that y is chosen in B suggests that y is at least as good as everything else in B.
Such a decision maker would therefore consider x to be at least as good as everything
else in A ∪B and hence would choose x from this expanded menu, as required by the
axiom.
Proposition 1
The following statements are equivalent:
(a) A choice correspondence C :M։ X satisfies A1–A4.
(b) There is a unique (possibly incomplete) preorder % on X such that, for all A ∈M,
x ∈ C(A) ⇐⇒ x % y for all y ∈ A (1)
We will refer to this as the Maximally Dominant Choice (MDC) model. It portrays
a cautious decision maker who maximizes her incompletely ordered weak preferences
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and chooses from a menu if and only if this menu contains an alternative that is weakly
preferred to everything else feasible. In this case, one such alternative is chosen. If no
such object can be found, the prediction is that choice will be deferred. For such a
decision maker, an alternative being merely “undominated” by strict preference (Sen,
1971; Schwartz, 1976; Eliaz and Ok, 2006) is no longer sufficient for it to be declared
choosable. For example, if A is a menu where some x ∈ A is such that x % y for all
y in A, the model predicts that x is chosen from A. Yet, if B := A ∪ {y} is another
menu where y is %-incomparable to x, the prediction is that this incomparability is
sufficiently detrimental for nothing to be chosen from B.3
It is clear that introducing Decisiveness into the above model delivers Arrow’s (1959)
classic result of utility-maximizing behavior in this framework of abstract choice.
Corollary 2
The following statements are equivalent:
(a) A choice correspondence C :M։ X satisfies A0–A1.
(b) There is a unique complete preorder % on X such that (1) holds for all A ∈M.
Notably, Proposition 1 appears to be the first result in the literature that generalizes
rational choice without relaxing WARP.
It is worth noting that the model’s predictions are compatible in a straightforward
way with experimental findings on choice from conflict-inducing multi-attribute alter-
natives such as those reported by Tversky and Shafir (1992). These findings suggest
that, given two alternatives x and y that dominate each other in some important at-
tribute, many people are willing to choose x when x is the only feasible option and y
when y is the only feasible option, but nothing when both x and y (and only them) are
feasible. If preferences are let to coincide with the usual partial ordering on attribute
space, then one would have x % x, y % y and x 6% y, y 6% x, in which case (1) would
indeed predict C({x}) = {x}, C({y}) = {y} and C({x, y}) = ∅, consistent with the
findings.
In addition to the above experimental findings, the model is also compatible with
evidence suggesting the occurrence and disappearance of the so called “choice over-
load” effect. This refers to the phenomenon whereby decision makers defer significantly
more often when faced with large menus that contain many alternatives than when
they are faced with smaller ones. The first evidence for this effect came from the field
3In particular, neither x nor any other alternative in A that is indifferent to x is chosen (y is obviously not chosen
either). To see this, suppose z ∼ x and z ∈ A. Clearly, z ∈ C(A). If z ∈ C(B), then z % y. But then x ∼ z % y implies
x % y, which contradicts the postulate that y is incomparable to x.
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and was reported in Iyengar and Lepper (2000). One of the explanations that have
been proposed for this phenomenon is that deferral in large menus is caused by the
lack of familiarity and the absence of a most preferred option (Iyengar and Lepper,
2000; Scheibenhenne, Greifeneder, and Todd, 2010). Intuitively, the higher the degree
of incompleteness in the agent’s preferences, the more likely it is that as the size of
the menu increases the number of incomparable pairs will become so large that no
alternative is preferred to all others. This explanation is compatible with (1). Equally
importantly, however, the model is also compatible with the explanation of how the
effect breaks down when a dominant option is added to a large menu at which choice
would have otherwise been deferred (Scheibenhenne et al, 2010). Indeed, as explained
above, this happens when C(A) = ∅, regardless of the size of A, and when an alterna-
tive x is added to A such that x % y for all y ∈ A, in which case C(A ∪ {x}) = {x}.
Thus, Proposition 1 offers incompleteness-driven theoretical predictions for both the
occurrence and the disappearance of the choice overload effect.
Conceptually closest to the MDC model is the Conflict Decision Avoidance (CDA)
choice procedure that was proposed and axiomatized in Dean (2008). The domain
of choice there includes decision problems of the form (A, s) where A is a menu and
s ∈ A is an explicit status quo that takes the form of an alternative that is feasible in
A just like all other alternatives. The choice rule there is such that the agent has an
incomplete preference relation % over the alternatives and chooses a maximizer of this
relation as in (1) if one exists. If not, then she chooses the status quo s if no alternative
that is “better” than s (where “better” here is captured by a correspondence that is
distinct from the agent’s preferences) is available in A, while she chooses a maximizer
of the completion of % otherwise. The first difference between the MDC and CDA
model is that the former restricts its attention to decision problems in which avoidance
is associated with choice deferral and not with status quo bias. That is, avoidance in
our model corresponds to choosing none of the feasible options as opposed to retaining
the option that the agent is already endowed with, which is the hallmark of status
quo bias. Choice deferral is not permissible in the CDA model because the choice
correspondence there is assumed to be nonempty-valued. Moreover, MDC features a
choice procedure in which the agent conforms fully with WARP whereas this axiom is
generally violated in the CDA model due to the agent’s status quo bias. Finally, unlike
the CDA model, the behavior captured in (1) does not rely on the agent using any one
of many possible completions of her preferences. As such, the problem of recovering
the agent’s preferences under the assumption that the data have been generated by
the model is straightforward in the case of the MDC choice procedure.
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3.2 Consistency and Efficiency
The cautious behavior associated with the MDC model of choice deferral might be
prescribable to a regret-averse individual whose preferences are incomplete and who
holds the pessimistic belief that if she chooses something that is merely not worse
than anything and not necessarily weakly better than everything feasible, she will
likely discover later (possibly after receiving additional information) that one of the
non-chosen options that was incomparable to what she eventually chose will turn out
to be better. One may argue then that, in anticipation of the negative emotions
that such an event may bring, an optimal course of action for her would be to defer
choice from such a menu in order to avoid those emotions. This is one psychological
mechanism that has been suggested as an explanation for the experimental findings
on choice deferral due to decision conflict (Luce, 1998; Anderson, 2003).
However, although deferring in the above example does indeed protect the decision
maker from the negative emotions that are associated with regret, this comes at a
cost. Upon recalling that all alternatives are desirable by assumption it becomes
evident that, unless preferences are complete, this decision rule necessarily prescribes
behavior that is seemingly inefficient in some menus. The argument here is that the
individual would be better off with either alternative, but she chooses none unless she
can find one that is most preferred. On the surface, therefore, a trade-off seems to be
inherent in this model: Whenever preferences are incomplete and all alternatives are
desirable, an agent’s choices are consistent in the strong sense of WARP, Contraction
Consistency and Strong Expansion only if they are occasionally inefficient in the sense
that all feasible alternatives are rejected even though all of them are desirable. Yet,
this conclusion that inefficiency is a necessary condition for full choice consistency in
the presence of incompleteness ignores the preceding discussion for the possible role of
psychological factors in the decision to defer, and hence appears to be too strong. We
attempt a slightly more nuanced analysis on this issue later in the paper by enriching
the MDC model with the inclusion of decision costs into the agent’s problem, which
can be thought of as being driven by such procedural considerations.
3.3 Indifference and Incomparability
A theoretical problem that arises naturally in models of decision making where pref-
erences are incomplete is how one may use data from an individual’s choices to distin-
guish between pairs of alternatives where the individual is indifferent and those where
she is unable to make a comparison. Two such criteria have recently been suggested
in the choice-theoretic literature and are due to Eliaz and Ok (2006) and Mandler
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(2009).
According to the Eliaz-Ok criterion, the individual is indifferent between two al-
ternatives x and y if for every menu where one is choosable and the other is feasible,
the latter is choosable too. In contrast, the individual is indecisive if both x and y are
choosable in {x, y} and there also exists a menu such that one is chosen and the other
is rejected. The indifference condition is the same as in all models of rational choice
where indifference is permissible, and is not associated with a WARP violation. The
condition for incomparability on the other hand is that both x and y are choosable
in {x, y} but there also exists a menu where one is choosable and the other is not,
although feasible. Thus, the incomparability condition is defined in terms of a WARP
violation (specifically, a violation of Sen’s (1971) Property β). As pointed out in Eliaz
and Ok (2006), however, distinguishing between indifference and incomparability in
this way presupposes that the agent’s preferences satisfy the condition (called “regu-
larity” in their paper) that whenever x and y are incomparable, there exists an option
z that is either incomparable to x and comparable to y by strict preference, or it is
incomparable to y and comparable to x by strict preference.
According to Mandler’s criterion, the presence of incomparability can be detected by
sequential trades of alternatives that are not ranked by strict preference. Specifically,
if such sequential trades eventually result in the decision maker owning an alternative
that is either strictly better or strictly worse to the one she started off with, then she
must have been indecisive at some point along the sequence of pairs that were involved
in the trades. On the other hand, in the absence of such a strict preference ranking it
cannot be ruled out that the agent was indifferent throughout. A practical difficulty
associated with this money-pump-like criterion is that observations from sequential
pairwise exchanges in which the decision maker is endowed with an alternative are not
easily obtainable.
The MDC model of Proposition 1 suggests a third criterion for disentangling indif-
ference and incomparability based on observable behavior. According to this model,
the agent’s psychological state concerning alternatives x and y reflects:
Indifference, if and only if x ∈ C(A) implies y ∈ C(A) for all A ∈M where x, y ∈ A.
Incomparability, if and only if for every A ∈ M such that x, y ∈ A it holds that
x, y 6∈ C(A).
As in Eliaz and Ok (2006) (and also consistent with any model of rational choice), the
agent is indifferent between x and y if and only if each one is always chosen in the
presence of the other. Unlike either of the above criteria, however, the agent here is
revealed to be indecisive between x and y if and only if neither of them is ever chosen
in the presence of the other. This novel criterion is the first to allow for a distinction
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between these two psychological concepts for WARP-consistent agents with incomplete
preferences. Moreover, unlike Eliaz and Ok (2006) and Mandler (2009), no restrictions
on the agent’s preferences and no data from sequential choices in which the agent is
endowed with some option are necessary for this distinction to be made in this model.
An interesting relationship exists between the properties of the MDC model and
the revealed-preference analysis in Bernheim and Rangel (2009) where the researcher
wishes to infer preferences from (generally non-WARP-consistent) choices without
knowing which procedure has generated the data. Specifically, an alternative x is
interpreted as being strictly preferred to another alternative y in Bernheim and Rangel
(2009) if there is no menu in which y is chosen and x is feasible. In the MDC model,
x is revealed preferred to y if, in addition, there is a menu in which x is chosen over
y. Thus, although the Bernheim-Rangel condition is necessary for x to be revealed
preferred to y under the MDC model it is not sufficient. In fact, as is evident from the
preceding discussion, this condition is also necessary for x to be revealed incomparable
to y in the MDC model. Interestingly, however, the absence of a revealed preference
relation a` la Bernheim and Rangel between x and y exactly coincides with the revealed
incomparability relation of the MDC model, as can be easily verified.
3.4 Incomparability and Undesirability
As already mentioned, in addition to incomparability and the associated decision con-
flict, an intuitive source of choice-deferring behavior is the potential undesirability
of all feasible alternatives in a given menu. The MDC model assumes this away by
means of the Desirability axiom. It is worth noting, however, that if choice obser-
vations from singleton menus are unavailable for some reason, then the behavior of
an individual who sets a desirability threshold for choosing an alternative, and who
is otherwise a utility maximizer, is observationally indistinguishable from that of an
indecisive individual who chooses by maximizing an incomplete preorder as in (1).
For example, let X = {v, w, x, y, z} and consider an agent whose preferences are
such that v % w % x ≻ y % z, and who thinks that y and z are undesirable and
hence would never be chosen. This person’s choices from non-singleton menus would
be identical to those of a decision maker who chooses according to (1) with transitive
but incomplete preferences such that v % w, x, y, z, w % x, y, z, x % y, z and with
y, z being incomparable. This observational equivalence obviously breaks down if data
from singletons are available, for in that case an individual whose deferral is solely
indecisiveness-driven would choose from all singletons, unlike someone who defers ex-
clusively due to undesirability. It is possible, however, that deferral observations for
a given decision maker are caused by incomparability as well as undesirability, In this
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case, it will generally be impossible to infer incomparability from observable behav-
ior if the incomparable alternatives also happen to be undesirable and hence never
chosen.4
4 Costly Deferrals and Costly Choice Reversals
With our experimental design (detailed in the next section) we aimed at truthfully
eliciting the individuals’ possibly incomplete weak preferences by allowing them to
defer choice. This was done by introducing two periods of decision making (one before
and one after exposure to potentially useful information about the alternatives), and
also by associating a cost with deferring choice in the first period and a higher cost
with changing a first-period choice in the second period. The rationale for building
the experimental design around the provision of potentially useful extra information
is motivated by the view that one of the sources of preference incompleteness is insuf-
ficient information about the alternatives (Sen, 1997). When incompleteness is indeed
rooted in limited information, one would expect the decision maker to be willing to
incur a small cost for the possibility of receiving additional information that might
help her complete her preferences. This idea motivates the two-stage structure that
we’ve adopted in our design as well as the introduction of monetary costs.
Although Proposition 1 characterizes behavior that results in rational, incompleteness-
driven choice deferral, it provides a static model that is also silent about any delibera-
tion costs or other psychological reasons that may drive such behavior. Nevertheless,
intuition suggests that when an agent decides to defer choice when faced with a menu,
she does so because the cost associated with choosing under these circumstances ex-
ceeds the cost of deferring. Examples of deferral costs include the one associated with
discounting future consumption and the one linked to the risk of some alternatives no
longer being available when the decision maker later returns to the problem. Examples
of costs associated with choice reversals include the psychological cost of regretting a
bad choice as well as actual monetary costs (for instance, when the agent wishes to
return a purchased item to a store with a no-returns policy). Such costs are absent
from the MDC choice procedure but incorporating them into it is essential for a more
comprehensive understanding of the mechanism that leads to incompleteness-driven
deferral, and for a better theoretical guidance for the experimental design. Below, we
provide a procedural foundation for the MDC model along these lines by introducing
the notion of a decision cost function.
4See Section 6.1 for more on this issue and how we attempt to address it in the context of the experiment described
below.
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4.1 A Procedural Foundation
For a decision maker with preferences over X that are captured by a possibly incom-
plete preorder %, a decision cost function is a mapping ψ
%
: M∪ {∅} → R+. This
function associates each element A of M∪ {∅} with a non-negative cost, which is to
be interpreted as the cost of choosing from menu A or of deferring if A = ∅. Intu-
itively, choice from a menu A is costless if and only if a most preferred option exists
in that menu. On the other hand, if such an option does not exist, choice is costly
as it entails the possibility that the chosen item will turn out to be inferior to some
other non-chosen one if the agent’s preferences are completed later. The result below
establishes the existence of a decision cost function with this property.
Proposition 3
There exists a decision cost function ψ
%
: M∪ {∅} → R+ such that, for all A ∈ M,
ψ
%
(A) = 0 if and only if there is x ∈ A such that x % y for all y ∈ A.
Suppose the agent is endowed with such a function ψ
%
and suppose also that deferral
is costly for this individual and that this cost is the same for every menu in which
deferral takes place, so that ψ
%
(∅) := c∅ > 0.
5 Finally, let the sets of dominant (most
preferred) and undominated (non-inferior) elements in menu A be denoted by
B%(A) := {x ∈ A : x % y for all y ∈ A}
M%(A) := {x ∈ A : y ⊁ x for all y ∈ A}
respectively. With this notation and assumptions, rational behavior for an agent that
is characterized by these preferences and decision cost function is described by the
following procedural choice rule which extends the baseline MDC model:
C(A) =


B%(A), if B%(A) 6= ∅
∅, if B%(A) = ∅ and ψ%(A) > c∅
M%(A), if B%(A) = ∅ and ψ%(A) < c∅
(2)
5This assumption is satisfied in our experimental design. In various real-world situations, however, it is reasonable
to expect the cost of deferral to vary across decision problems.
18
According to this choice rule, whenever the agent is presented with a menu, she
first checks whether she can find a most preferred alternative or not. If she can, then
she chooses one of these best options. If she can’t, then she decides between deferring
and choosing randomly from the set of undominated feasible options on the basis of
whether, given her preferences over outcomes that are captured by %, deferring is
less or more costly compared to choosing an undominated option from that menu.
Notice that, in this formulation, the agent does not assign an expected value to the
information she will receive later before deciding between choosing or deferring when
a dominant option does not exist.
Importantly, if it holds that ψ
%
(A) > ψ
%
(∅) for all menus A ∈ M in which no
dominant option exists, then this procedural model is observationally equivalent to
the MDC model. One implication of this equivalence is that it provides a justification
for deferring and thereby foregoing a desirable option when the cost of choosing in
the absence of a preference-dominant alternative is high enough (e.g. due to regret
aversion, or due to the high cost of returning a product to a shop once it has been pur-
chased). A second implication is that, although these decision costs should generally
be regarded as idiosyncratic, this observational equivalence suggests that if individuals
do proceed according to (2) and these costs can somehow be exogenously controlled
by an experimenter in a lab environment so that the above condition is satisfied, then
such a design would provide an indirect way of testing the MDC model of choice de-
ferral in the lab even though this primitive model characterized by (1) is silent about
decision costs.
4.2 A Savage Rationalization
The situation whereby the agent must decide between choosing and deferring when
faced with a menu under the knowledge that more information about the alternatives
in that menu will be provided later can also be modelled “rationally” with an agent
who has complete and transitive preferences in the first period and acknowledges that
her preferences may change in the second period. In particular, such an agent can
be modelled as a Bayesian, subjective expected utility-maximizing agent a` la Savage
(1954) when it comes to her decision to defer or to choose her currently most preferred
option in the first period. We briefly outline this alternative explanation, following
which we also express our reservations as to how suitable this may be for descriptive
purposes in the present context.
In the first period when the agent is faced with menu A ⊆ X she can be thought of
as having complete and transitive preferences that are represented by an ordinal utility
function u. The agent knows that more information about the alternatives in A will
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be provided in the second period, which may or may not change her most preferred
option in A. Thus, the state space S can be thought of as consisting of two states, s1
and s2, with s1 capturing the state where the agent’s set of most preferred options in
A remains unchanged after the extra information is provided, and with s2 reflecting
the state where this set changes.6
Let F ≡ R2+ denote the set of all Savage acts from the state space S = {s1, s2} to the
outcome set of decision costs that is captured by the non-negative real line. Although
the set S is finite and hence outside the range of Savage’s (1954) subjective expected
utility theorem, it is known since Gul (1992) that axioms on an agent’s preference
relation 3 over F exist which suffice for the existence of a cardinally unique utility
function v : R → R and of a subjective prior belief that is captured by a probability
measure p on S such that, for any f, g ∈ F ,
f 3 g ⇐⇒ Epv(f) ≥ Epv(g)
where Epv(f) :=
∑2
i=1 p(si)v(f(si)).
Given this framework, the possible actions of chooosing and of deferring in the
first period can be thought of as two acts c, d ∈ F . In terms of the agent’s preferences
between these two acts, the restriction imposed by our design (namely, the introduction
of a cost associated with deferral) suggests that
v(c(s1)) > v(d(s1)) and v(c(s2)) < v(d(s2))
That is, if it turns out that the additional information does result to a change in
the agent’s most preferred options in A, deferring in the first period is preferred to
choosing. By contrast, if the additional information does not lead to such a change,
choosing is preferred to deferring. Clearly, if deferral had not been costly, the agent
would have been indifferent between the two acts.
A rational agent that has subjective expected utility preferences over acts concern-
ing his second-period preferences over outcomes in A ultimately decides in the first
period between deferring and choosing the currently most preferred option according
6It should be noted though that these two sets may be distinct and yet overlap. For instance, if A = {w, x, y, z}, it
may be that the set of best elements in the first period is {w, x}, whereas the optimal set in the second period is {w}.
For simplicity, we assume that this case falls under state s2.
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to the following choice rule:7
C(A) =


∅, if Epv(d) > Epv(c)
argmax
x∈A
u(x), if Epv(d) < Epv(c)
(3)
Possible as it may be to approach the decision between choosing and deferring
in this way, reservations can be expressed regarding the descriptive relevance of this
approach in the present context. First, one can argue that the agent’s postulated pref-
erence uncertainty that lies at the heart of this alternative formulation can actually
be interpreted as the absence of a most preferred option in the first period, and hence
as incompleteness. In particular, if the agent is willing to incur a cost in order to
obtain additional information about the alternatives before choosing, she essentially
lacks confidence in her preferences that are conditional on the currently available infor-
mation, which she therefore regards as being only temporary. This lack of confidence
can, in turn, be interpreted as evidence that the “stable” or “permanent” component
of her preferences is incomplete, for if this component was complete there would be
no willingness of the agent to incur a cost for deferring in the first place.8
The second argument against this approach is methodological. Specifically, the fact
that a subjective expected utility rationalization of the problem is possible provides
no a priori reason to believe that this is a descriptively more accurate model of de-
cision making in this environment. In particular, the Bayesian model is cognitively
more demanding than the ones characterized by (1)(or its observationally equivalent
counterpart in (2)) because it requires that the agents have complete and transitive
preferences over the alternatives and that they evaluate the acts of deferring and of
choosing according to an expected utility function and by forming beliefs over the state
space, as opposed to following a simple decision rule that builds on maximization of
an incomplete preference relation over the alternatives. We refer the reader to Spiegler
(2011) for a more detailed discussion of some problems associated with attempting to
“rationalize” models that attempt to explain phenomena that are most simply viewed
as deviations from utility-maximizing behavior.
Finally, one notes that the great flexibility in explaining choices that the modeller
would obtain by employing the above Bayesian model (and therefore of specifying the
ordinal utility function u, the expected utility function v and the prior belief p) also
7Although this formulation ignores the possibility that second-period utility is discounted, for our purposes this is
not a limitation. Indeed, as will become clear below, there is practically no difference between the first and the second
period in our experimental design (in the sense that it is not possible for the subject to obtain the good at the end of
the first period). Hence, introducing discounting here appears superfluous.
8See Minardi and Savochkin (2014) and Hill (2014) for axiomatic analyses of multi-prior representations of incomplete
preferences under uncertainty where conceptually different connections between confidence and incompleteness are
made.
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comes at the cost of an increased difficulty in finding choice data that would falsify
this model. Moreover, the fact that the Bayesian choice rule captured by (3) relies on
a comparison of the agent’s subjective expected utility values associated with various
acts suggests that when this model does explain a dataset with instances of choice
deferral as well as the MDC model of incomplete preferences does, there will generally
be many such triples (u, v, p) that achieve such an explanation. By contrast, as is clear
from Proposition 1, if the MDC model explains the data, then it does so by means of
a unique incomplete preference relation. In principle, therefore, the modeller can hope
to make much sharper inferences when carrying out the analysis through the lens of
(1) than through the lens of (3).
5 Experimental Design
We used a between-subjects design with two treatments: Forced-Choice (FC) and Non-
Forced-Choice (NFC). The experimental interface was created with the z-Tree software
(Fischbacher, 2007). The grand choice set X consisted of five headsets, with their
brands and models chosen so that their price was approximately the same (between
£10 and £20 at the time of purchase) but their attributes differed in ways that could
potentially generate natural decision conflict and incomparability to subjects. For
instance, some headsets were basic but with well-known brand names whereas others
were more sophisticated or had some superior or distinctive features but with not as
easily recognizable labels (e.g. the headset with the least known brand name was
wireless whereas all others were not).
The menus (decision problems) consisted of images of the headsets and of a short
description of their main features (see Appendix 3 for an example). In order to make
the decision problems as realistic as possible, the short description of each headset’s
main features reproduced exactly the same information (in bullet-point form) that
the large online retailer (Amazon.co.uk) from which the headsets were purchased had
chosen to provide on the relevant product’s web page. As a consequence, a direct
attribute-by-attribute comparison of the various headsets was typically impossible
because the information for different items revolved around different attributes. We
anticipated that this fact would be an additional source of incomparability for some
subjects, and that these subjects would welcome the possibility of obtaining more
information about the alternatives before choosing.
The principal aim of our design was to generate incentives that would elicit the
subjects’ relations of preference, indifference and, in the case of the NFC treatment,
incomparability over headsets. In both treatments every subject was presented with
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the sequence of all 31 menus generated from X. The order in which menus appeared
was random. It varied across sessions but was the same for all subjects within each
session. This was also true for the order from left to right in which headsets appeared
in each menu (but it was ensured that each item appeared top-left, middle, top-right
etc. in an even manner).
Subjects in the FC treatment were asked to choose a headset from all menus pre-
sented to them, without being able to defer choice. Subjects in the NFC treatment
had the opportunity to choose one headset in each menu or to select “I’m not choosing
now”. Once past a menu, subjects could not go back to review and change their choice
(with one crucial exception described in the next paragraph).
In both treatments, after everyone had made a decision (including “I’m not choosing
now” in the NFC treatment) in all 31 menus, one menu was randomly selected for each
subject. Each subject then saw their own randomly selected menu and was reminded
of the decision they had made there initially. Then, in groups of four, subjects were
asked to go to the desk where the five headsets were on display, and to silently inspect
the ones in their randomly selected menus and try them out while listening to the music
provided by a central source. Following this stage subjects went back to their desks
and were asked to choose one of the headsets. Therefore, they could either maintain
their original choice or to change it (if one had been made in the NFC treatment).
In the case of subjects in the NFC treatment who had not chosen a headset when
originally presented with that menu, they had to choose one at this stage.
Everyone was informed from the beginning that, at the very end of the experiment,
1 out of every 4 subjects would be randomly selected to win the headset of their final
choice from their randomly selected menu. We referred to such subjects as “winners”.
Also from the beginning they were told that winners might face some costs (which
would reduce the amount of £7 initially allocated to them), depending on their first
and second decisions at the randomly selected menu. In particular, if a subject that
later became a winner had decided to choose a headset other than the one he or she
originally selected from this menu, £4 were taken away from her initially allocated £7.
In contrast, there was no deduction if the subject opted for the same headset again
the second time they chose from that menu. Finally, subjects in the NFC treatment
who originally deferred at their randomly selected menu and later became winners had
to choose one headset from this menu the second time they saw it at the cost of a
£1 deduction from the initial allocation of £7. Subjects were told from the beginning
that if they were not selected to win a headset they would receive their full £7 fee
irrespective of their first and second decisions at the randomly selected menu.
Given that at most one headset was chosen from every menu, in order to disen-
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tangle between strict preference and indifference, and also between indifference and
incomparability, we used the following, questionnaire-based method. At each binary
menu, subjects were first asked to make a decision and then to select one of three
explanations for their decision. If they had chosen a headset, they could select that
i)“they preferred it to the other headphone set in this menu” ii) “they found both to be
equally good, and therefore chose randomly”; iii) “other reason”. Subjects were also
told from the beginning that if a menu with two headsets was randomly selected for
them and they had previously stated that “they found both to be equally good”, then
they would not get the chance to change their choice at that stage if they had chosen a
headset. Thus, subjects had no incentive to state indifference in binary menus where
they chose a headset if they were not actually indifferent, because in the event that
their randomly selected menu was binary this statement would deprive them from
the possibility of benefiting from making a final choice after having tried out the two
relevant headsets. We note that this design does not make it a dominant strategy
for subjects who are indifferent to state so. It does, however, make such a statement
an undominated strategy, provided subjects are truly indifferent (in which case they
would not value the additional information or the opportunity to change their choice
later).
Following binary menus where their decision was the “I’m not choosing now” option,
subjects were asked if they made this choice because “they could not decide which one
they prefer”, because “they found both to be equally good” or due to some “other
reason”. If such a menu was randomly selected for them and they had deferred choice
at that menu and had also stated indifference, then in the event that they were winners,
the £1 deferral cost was applied and they won the headset that was determined by
the flip of a coin. The coin-flip procedure did not apply in the other two cases.
Before the beginning of the main task (i.e. the sequential presentation of all 31
menus), subjects were presented with a mini (“trial”) version with three alternatives
(MP3 players) that aimed to familiarize them with the experimental interface. All
decision problems in the trial were hypothetical and subjects were aware of this. After
the trial, subjects were asked to answer a series of questions that tested their under-
standing of the instructions. Subjects had to answer all questions correctly before
proceeding to the main phase of the experiment. They were given three attempts
to get their answers right, and those who still had incorrect answers after the third
attempt were excluded.
After the end of the main task of the experiment (i.e. after the decisions at the
31 menus) subjects were asked to fill in a personality questionnaire that included the
indecisiveness items in Germeijs and Boeck (2002). The possible responses to these
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items were captured in a 8-level Likert scale and ranged between “strongly disagree”
(0) and “strongly agree” (7). Two sample items in the questionnaire were “I find
it easy to make decisions” and “I enjoy working out problems slowly and carefully”,
respectively (see also Appendix 5).
Under the assumption that subjects decide according to the procedural choice rule
described in (2), and provided that one condition that is described below is also sat-
isfied, our design makes it incentive compatible for those in the NFC treatment to
choose their most preferred option from every menu in the main phase of the experi-
ment if they can find such an option, and to defer otherwise. In the latter case, they
will incur a £1 cost with probability 1
4
· 1
31
= 1
124
, i.e. the probability of being winners
times the probability that the given menu is randomly selected for them (the two
events are independent). On the other hand, if subjects don’t have a preferred option
in a menu and they do not defer, rationality suggests that they will choose one of the
non-inferior headsets. In this case, if this becomes their randomly selected menu and
they decide to choose a headset other than the one they had chosen initially after they
are exposed to the possibility of obtaining additional information, the change would
come at a cost of £4 if they were winners. Therefore, the expected cost associated
with non-deferring at such a menu A is 1
31
× 1
4
× pAr × £4, where p
A
r is the subjective
probability of the subject that she will choose something else once she has inspected
the headsets. Crucially, therefore, assuming that the probability of a choice reversal
is greater than 1
4
(a very low threshold for a pAr associated with random choice) in
all menus where a most preferred option does not exist, the expected cost of choice
reversal is always greater than the expected cost of deferral, £ 1
124
.
In the language of the procedural model, the decision costs here are exogenously
imposed and are such that ψ
%
(∅) = 1
124
, ψ
%
(A) = 0 if B%(A) 6= ∅ and ψ%(A) >
1
124
if
B%(A) = ∅. That is, under the assumption that p
A
r >
1
4
for each menu A, choosing
the most preferred option in a given menu is associated with zero expected cost, while
deferring and choosing randomly if such an option does not exist is associated with a
cost of 1
124
and some cost greater than 1
124
, respectively.9 It follows from (2), therefore,
that C(A) = B%(A) if B%(A) 6= ∅ and C(A) = ∅ otherwise, a prediction that, of
course, coincides with (1) in the MDC model.
Although the above argument relies on comparing expected costs, we note that the
conclusion associated with it is actually strengthened if the framework of prospect
theory is employed. In this case, the agent is thought of as having a reference wealth
level r = £7 and as comparing prospects by using a probability weighting function
pi : [0, 1] → [0, 1] and a value function v : X → R capturing the values of changes
9A similar argument would explain why subjects in the FC treatment also have an incentive not to randomize but
to make an effort to find their most preferred option in every menu.
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to the agent’s wealth relative to the reference point. The main features of the model
are a) overweighting of low probabilities; b) convex-valuedness (risk-seeking behavior)
in the domain of losses, and c) disproportionately negative effect of losses relative
to equal-magnitude gains (loss aversion). In the specification that was proposed by
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) the two functions are
pi(p) =
p0.69
(p0.69 + (1− p)0.69)
1
0.69
and
v(x) =


(x− 7)0.88, if x ≥ 7
−2.25 · (7− x)0.88, if x < 7
where x denotes final wealth level (x = 7, x = 6 or x = 3), 0.69 is the probability-
weighting parameter value for losses,10 0.88 is the parameter value for the marginal
sensitivity to gains and losses, and -2.25 is the parameter of loss aversion. Under this
specification, the prospect of deferring at some menu A is associated with an expected
payoff of pi( 1
124
) · (−2.25), while the prospect of choosing randomly gives an expected
payoff of pi( p
A
r
124
) · (−2.25) · 40.88. It turns out that the former is greater than the latter
for every pAr '
1
6
. Therefore, prospect theory suggests that, in the absence of a most
preferred option in menu A, deferral is better than random choice under an even less
restrictive condition than the one derived under the analysis of expected costs.
The preceding simple arithmetic (both the one based on expected costs and the one
based on prospect theory) is hopefully useful in substantiating the claim concerning the
potential suitability of our design for the problem at hand. However, although subjects
had pen and paper in front of them and could carry out these calculations themselves
if they wanted to, we find it more realistic to believe that those who deferred instead
of choosing in the absence of a dominant option did so due to the relative salience
between the prospect of losing £1 vs that of losing £4 that are associated with these
actions, respectively, and not because they carried out all necessary computations and
ultimately compared two very small expected costs.
10Since there is no possibility for a gain in our context, only the probability weighting function that is relevant for
losses was presented above.
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6 Empirical Findings
6.1 Data
After data exclusions for various reasons,11 our FC and NFC treatment comprised 76
and 149 subjects, respectively. These were students of various fields and all levels at
the University of St Andrews. Students of economics and other quantitative fields
were distributed evenly across the two treatments.
All subjects’ indifference statements that were elicited from their choices from bi-
nary menus in the way described above were analyzed. Statements that led to vi-
olations of transitivity were not used in subsequent analysis. For instance, when a
subject stated indifference between headsets x and y and also between y and z, but a
strict preference between x and z, then we disregarded these statements. A total of
46 subjects in the NFC treatment (31%) stated indifferences after choices in binary
menus. For twenty-seven of these subjects the statements were transitive. In the FC
treatment, 29 subjects (38%) expressed indifference, and the statements in 24 of those
were transitive. Therefore, a higher proportion of FC subjects expressed indifference
in a way that allowed us to incorporate this data into the analysis compared to NFC
subjects (31.5% vs 18%). In both treatments, however, the median number of (valid)
indifference statements was 1.
6.2 Deferral and Incompleteness
As is discussed below, a relatively large number of subjects deferred at some singleton
menus, contrary to the experimental design’s induced incentives and also contrary
to the predictions of both the MDC and the Bayesian model. In particular, the
presence of such subjects makes the identification of those who may have deferred due
to incompleteness a non-straightforward task. Our approach towards identifying these
subjects was pluralistic in that it combined choice data on the one hand with the
responses in the post-binary menu questions and the post-experiment questionnaire
on the other. The main item of interest in this questionnaire included the following
options (reproduced in a compact form here) as possible responses to the question
of what were the reasons for the subject’s deferrals: a) “incomparability/lack of a
preferred option” b) “undesirability” c) “effort avoidance” d) “other reason”. Subjects
11Three subjects did not reach the main phase of the experiment due to their failure to demonstrate that they had
understood the instructions by the end of their third attempt at the quiz questions. Datasets from eight subjects were
excluded ex post due to other reasons (i.e. deferral in all 31 menus and written or oral comments at the end of the
experiment that showed incorrect understanding of the instructions).
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were able to choose as many of these options as applied, and to explain in detail what
other reason was relevant to them, if any. Following this combined analysis, subjects
who deferred in some menu(s) were classified as having deferred at least in part due to
incompleteness if one of the following sets of conditions were met:
1) Subjects chose at all singleton menus, they deferred in some binary menu(s) and
either stated “incomparability” as the reason for doing so in at least one of the post-
binary menu questions or stated “incomparability” as one of the reasons for deferral
in the post-experiment questionnaire. A total of 18 subjects belonged to this main
category of incompleteness-driven deferral.
2) Subjects deferred in two singletons {x} and {y} and did not choose either x or
y in any other menu that included them, they attributed the deferral at the binary
menu {x, y} to “incomparability” in the post-binary menu question, and they also
stated “incomparability” as one of the reasons for deferral in the final questionnaire.
Intuitively, such subjects did not think x and y were desirable, but they also had
difficulty comparing them. A total of 11 subjects were grouped into this category (two
of them also belonged to category 4 below).
3) Subjects deferred in up to two singletons, chose these items in other menus that
included them and also stated “incomparability” (but not “undesirability”) as one
of the reasons for deferral in the post-experiment questionnaire. Such subjects were
regarded as having made a mistake by not choosing at these 1-2 singletons. A total of
7 subjects fitted this description (one of them was also included in category 4).
4) Subjects deferred in up to two singletons, say {x} and {y}, did not choose in
at least one binary menu that excluded x and y, and stated “incomparability” in the
relevant post-binary menu question or as one of the reasons for deferral in the final
questionnaire. Intuitively, even though such subjects had found x and y undesirable
and never chose them, there were menus that involved some of the remaining items, say
v, w and z, which were chosen as singletons but which subjects were unable to compare.
A total of 4 participants fitted this description, including the three mentioned above.
We removed altogether from all incompleteness-driven deferral subcategories those
subjects whose only stated reason for deferral in the post-experiment questionnaire
was “effort avoidance”, even if these subjects had chosen at all singletons. However,
those subjects in this group who attributed their deferral to “incomparability” as well
as to “effort avoidance” remained in Category 1.
A total of 37 subjects (25%) were considered to have deferred choice in some menus
at least in part due to preference incompleteness. Eighteen of these subjects chose at
all singleton menus, whereas 19 deferred choice in one or two singletons but met the
criteria of inclusion in one of Categories 2, 3 and 4 that were outlined above. At the
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same time, 10 subjects who deferred in some non-singleton menus and who chose at all
singletons were not included in this “incompleteness” group. Some of these subjects
had not deferred in binary menus, while others did so in every non-singleton menu and
stated that their reason for doing so was to avoid the effort associated with making a
careful decision from every menu, as explained above.
The 25% incompleteness-driven deferral rate in our sample lies within the range
of conflict-induced deferral that has been reported in the literature. For instance,
Tversky and Shafir (1992) found that 46% of their subjects deferred choice in conflict-
generating binary menus, while in Dhar and Simonson (2003) this rate ranged between
21% and 34%. The slightly lower rate that we report in comparison to many of these
studies can be attributed in part to the costless and hypothetical nature of choice
deferral in the latter. Another difference between our study and those above which
may be contributing to the lower deferral rate in our case is the absence of prices from
our product characteristics. Indeed, price-quality trade-offs were the main sources of
decision conflict in those studies. We note, however, that the 25% incompleteness
rate in our sample is very similar to the 28% rate that was reported in Danan and
Ziegelmeyer (2006) and corresponded to the “significantly indecisive” subjects in their
study.
The basic figures on choice deferral in our study are summarized in Table 1. Con-
trary to the experiment’s incentives, 60 of the 149 subjects (40%) in the NFC treat-
ment deferred in at least one singleton menu. For most of these subjects, the pattern
of choice as well as the written feedback they provided in their answers to the post-
experiment questionnaire suggested an imperfect understanding of the instructions
and of the incentives in place, with deferrals in their case caused primarily by the
perceived unattractiveness of the alternatives. It is worth noting, however, that this
fraction of subjects who avoided choice at singletons is much lower to those reported in
Mochon (2013), where the singleton deferral rates in a number of hypothetical choice
scenarios ranged between 76% and 91%. Unlike that paper, however, where the de-
ferral rate was significantly decreased when subjects were presented with all relevant
choice objects, most of our subjects who deferred at singletons also deferred in those
menus as well. This pattern is consistent with an undesirability-based explanation of
deferral.
Table 1: Choice Deferral Statistics
29
Subjects deferring in at least one non-singleton menu 77 (52%)
Subjects deferring only at non-singleton menus 28 (19%)
Subjects deferring in at least one singleton menu 60 (40%)
Subjects deferring due to incompleteness (Categories 1–4) 37 (25%)
Subjects deferring due to incompleteness and choosing at all singletons 18 (12%)
Median number (rate) of non-singleton deferrals in “incompleteness” group 5 (19%)
Average number (rate) of non-singleton deferrals in “incompleteness” group 7.7 (30%)
Finally, as far as the descriptive relevance of the MDC model in this subject pool
is concerned, we note that the behavior of 43.5% (98/225)and 39.5% (89/225) of
all subjects is exactly captured by it when indifference statements are included and
excluded, respectively. However, these rates rise to 60% and 54% respectively when
we only consider the subjects who did not defer at singleton menus. These proportions
correspond to subjects who were either utility maximizers and ones who deferred choice
but maximized preferences in a way that is consistent with the MDC model.
6.3 Consistency
The analysis and cross-treatment comparison of choice consistency is based on two
measures: The total number of WARP violations and the total number of violations
of an intuitive weakening of WARP called a-WARP. The latter relaxes the former by
requiring that for any two alternatives x and y and any menu A, if C({x, y}) = {x}
and y ∈ C(A), then x 6∈ A. As discussed in Gerasimou (2013), choices that do not
conform with a-WARP can be thought of as being inconsistent in a more fundamental
way than choices which do not abide with other restrictions that follow from WARP.
Therefore, using also the total number of a-WARP violations allows for a more robust
assessment and comparison of consistency across treatments.
Measuring the total number of violations of some normative principle in order to
analyze choice consistency was also adopted in Famulari (1995), where the focus was
on the total number of GARP violations in choices with price-income constraints. In
our context, the main advantage of this approach relative to alternative ones (e.g.
the SWAPS index of Apesteguia and Ballester (2010) or the minimum number of
changes in the dataset that are necessary to make it compatible with maximization of
a preference relation due to Houtman and Maks (1985)) is that the resulting consis-
tency measures are well-defined and easily calculable across the two treatments, i.e.
they do not rely on matching the observed data with some complete preference or-
dering. Moreover, some of the alternative methods that have recently been proposed
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(Echenique, Lee, and Shum, 2011; Choi, Kariv, Mu¨ller, and Silverman, 2014; Halevy,
Persitz, and Zrill, 2012; Dean and Martin, 2013) for analyzing choice consistency are
only applicable in choices from competitive budget sets.
Table 2 presents data concerning the proportions of WARP-consistent subjects12
across the two treatments. Relative to the FC group where this ratio is 54% when
indifference statements are ignored, this ratio is significantly higher in the NFC treat-
ment both when all subjects are included (70.5%) and also when attention is restricted
to the “incompleteness” group (73%). In both cases the difference in these ratios is
significant at the 5% level under Fisher’s exact test. However, once the subjects’
indifference statements are taken into account the difference is no longer significant
in either of the two cases. Specifically, inclusion of these statements increases the
ratio of WARP-consistent subjects in the FC treatment to 63% without changing it
significantly for subjects in the NFC treatment.
Table 2: Consistency Differences Across Treatments: Proportions of Consistent
Subjects
Indifference
FC (63%) vs NFC – All (73%) 0.083
FC (63%) vs NFC – Incompleteness (73%) 0.206
No Indifference
FC (54%) vs NFC – All (70.5%) 0.011
FC (54%) vs NFC – Incompleteness (73%) 0.040
Note: p-values correspond to 1-tailed Fisher exact tests
Next, using the Fligner-Policello robust rank order test we tested whether the me-
dian number of WARP and a-WARP violations is higher for subjects in the FC treat-
ment relative to all those in the NFC treatment and also those who belonged to the
“incompleteness” subgroup. The results are reported in Table 3 and again suggest
that there exists such a significant difference in both cases when indifference data are
ignored, but this difference is no longer significant when indifferences are accounted
for.
Table 3: Consistency Differences Across Treatments: Median Violations
Indifference No Indifference
WARP a-WARP WARP a-WARP
FC vs NFC – All 0.119 0.100 0.029 0.024
FC vs NFC – Incompleteness 0.160 0.158 0.023 0.026
12The proportions of a-WARP-consistent subjects coincided with those of WARP-consistent ones in our sample.
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Note: p-values corresponding to 1-tailed Fligner-Policello robust rank order tests
Moreover, using the subjects’ responses to the Germeijs and Boeck (2002) indeci-
sive personality questionnaire that was mentioned above (detailed in Appendix 5) we
constructed a psychological indecisiveness score for each of them, with higher scores
corresponding to more decisive personalities. Subjects in each treatment were then
split into two groups, the top-tertile- and bottom-tertile-decisive, respectively.13
Table 4: Consistency Differences Between Psychologically (In)decisive Subjects
Indifference No Indifference
WARP a-WARP WARP a-WARP
Decisive vs Indecisive within FC 0.049 0.080 0.012 0.013
Decisive vs Indecisive within NFC 0.384 0.386 0.454 0.409
Decisive in FC vs NFC 0.470 0.496 0.457 0.439
Indecisive in FC vs NFC 0.101 0.122 0.013 0.012
Note: p-values corresponding to 1-tailed Fligner-Policello robust rank order tests
Independent of whether WARP or a-WARP is taken to be the measure of consis-
tency, when indifference is ignored the more indecisive subjects who were forced to
choose were significantly more inconsistent than the more decisive subjects in that
same treatment. As above, consistency here is captured by the median number of vio-
lations and significance refers to the 5% level. Interestingly, however, and in line with
intuition, this difference disappears when a comparison between decisive and indecisive
subjects who were not forced to choose is made. This effect is manifested in the first
two rows of Table 4. Moreover, while decisive subjects across the two treatments were
not significantly different in their median number of violations, an observation similar
to the one above is made when comparing indecisive subjects across treatments (bot-
tom two rows). Together, these findings suggest that conditional on a subject being
indecisive, she is much more likely to be significantly more inconsistent than a decisive
subject when she is forced to choose than when she is not. Although this effect is no
longer significant when indifference data are included, one notes that the p-values are
not too far away from the significance threshold.
All results above highlight the crucial role that accounting for indifference has on
the conclusion on whether forcing subjects to choose (especially if their preferences are
incomplete) does or does not have a negative effect on their choice consistency. If our
indifference elicitation is sufficiently accurate, the answer that follows from our analysis
is negative. As mentioned in the introduction, such a conclusion would be reassuring
13A second categorization that we considered was that between above- and below-median decisive subjects. The
findings under this categorization were similar to those under the top/bottom tertile.
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given the prevalence of forced-choice methods in many experimental studies on indi-
vidual decision making, as it would suggest that no significant inconsistency bias can
be attributed to incompleteness. We note, however, that in the various comparative
tests that we conducted, the relevant p-values were often very low (although above
the significance threshold) even when indifferences had been accounted for. This sug-
gests that more such studies are needed before ruling out the possibility of a negative
forced-choice effect on consistency.
We finally checked for a positive relationship between indecisive subjects in the
NFC treatment and deferral rates as well as membership to the “incompleteness”
group. As expected, subjects with low decisiveness scores were more likely to belong
to the “incompleteness” group than those with high scores. Specifically, 28% vs 17% of
bottom- vs top-tertile decisive subjects belonged to the incompleteness group, respec-
tively. However, this difference was not statistically significant under Fisher’s exact
test. Indecisive subjects also deferred choice more often than decisive ones (with the
median number of deferrals being 2 and 0, respectively), but again the difference was
only marginally significant (p = 0.059). On the other hand, and consistently with
intuition, the Pearson correlation coefficient between decisiveness scores and instances
of deferral was found to be −0.21 and significant (p = 0.011).
7 Conclusions
The assumption that a decision maker’s preferences are complete lies at the heart of
economic theory. This paper has studied some theoretical and empirical implications
associated with choice behavior when preferences are not necessarily complete, and
especially how consistent this behavior can be in this context. We first identified con-
ditions that are necessary and sufficient for an individual with incomplete preferences
to make choices that conform with WARP. Choice deferral in menus where a most pre-
ferred option does not exist is the main consequence of this consistency requirement.
It was argued that this model can explain in a simple way experimental evidence on
deferral that is attributed to decision conflict and choice overload. It was also shown
that this model suggests a novel way of distinguishing between the notions of indif-
ference and incomparability between two alternatives that relies solely on observable
data.
We also discussed the view that, by deferring due to incompleteness at a menu in
which all alternatives are desirable, the individual might be thought of as behaving
inefficiently. We also challenged this view on the grounds that it ignores procedural
considerations such as regret aversion or other relevant costs which may outweigh the
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decision maker’s cost of foregoing desirable options. A simple extension of the model
was then suggested, providing a procedural rationalization of deferral vs choice of an
undominated option by associating a cost with each of these decisions.
We then presented an experimental design that introduced incentives which aimed
to truthfully elicit a subject’s possibly incomplete preferences by inducing her to choose
a most preferred feasible option when one exists and to defer otherwise. The main
idea in our two-stage design is that deferral in the first stage is costly, but changing
a previously made choice in the second stage is even more so. We also discussed the
formal conditions under which the design makes it incentive compatible for subjects
to behave in the above way.
The first main finding from our empirical study that built on this experimental
design is that a quarter of the subjects in the target treatment in which choice was not
forced deferred at least in part due to their inability to make preference comparisons.
There is evidence, therefore, that a sizeable minority of our subject population had
incomplete preferences over the five headphone sets that were presented to them. We
finally found evidence to suggest that subjects who were not forced to choose (in-
cluding subjects whose preferences were incomplete) made significantly more WARP-
consistent choices than those who were forced to do so, but we also found that this
negative forced-choice effect on consistency is considerably mitigated once the sub-
jects’ indifferences are taken into account. The latter fact highlights the important
role that indifference elicitation has for the empirical analysis of revealed-preference
data.
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Appendix 1: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1:
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(a) implies (b). Let C satisfy the axioms and define the relation % on X by x % y if
there exists A ∈M such that x ∈ C(A) and y ∈ A. Since all singletons are included in
M, it follows from A2 that % is reflexive. Suppose now that x % y and y % z for some
x, y, z ∈ X. There exist A,B ∈ M such that x ∈ C(A), y ∈ A and y ∈ C(B), z ∈ B.
From A4, x ∈ C(A ∪ B). Since {x, y, z} ∈ M by assumption and {x, y, z} ⊆ A ∪ B,
it follows from A3 that x ∈ C({x, y, z}). Hence, x % z and therefore % is transitive.
Suppose now that (1) is not satisfied. Assume first that there is A ∈ M such that
x ∈ A, x % y for all y ∈ A and x 6∈ C(A). If y ∈ C(A) for some y 6= x, then this
fact and x % y together contradict A1. Suppose C(A) = ∅ instead. The postulate
that x % y for all y ∈ A is equivalent to the postulate that for each y ∈ A there exists
By ∈ M such that y ∈ By and x ∈ C(By). Let S :=
⋃
{By : y ∈ A}. Clearly, A ⊆ S.
Moreover, the full domain assumption ensures that S ∈ M. Repeated application
of A4 gives x ∈ C(S). Since A ⊆ S, x ∈ A and A ∈ M, it follows from A3 that
x ∈ C(A). Conversely, if x ∈ C(A) and y ∈ A, then, by definition of %, x % y. Thus,
(1) holds. Uniqueness of % follows from the fact that all binary menus are included in
M.
(b) implies (a). Let % be a preorder on X and suppose (1) holds. Reflexivity of %
and (1) ensure that A2 is satisfied. Suppose A1 is not. There exist A,B ∈ M and
x, y ∈ X such that x ∈ C(A), y ∈ A\C(A), y ∈ C(B) and x ∈ B. Since x ∈ C(A) and
y ∈ A \ C(A), (1) implies x % y and y 6% x. Since y ∈ C(B) and x ∈ B, (1) implies
y % x, a contradiction. For A3 suppose x ∈ C(A), B ⊂ A and x ∈ B. Since x % y
for all y ∈ A and therefore for all y ∈ B ⊂ A, it also follows from (1) that x ∈ C(B).
Now let A,B ∈ M be such that x ∈ C(A), y ∈ A and y ∈ C(B). It is implied by (1)
that x % w for all w ∈ A and y % z for all z ∈ B. Therefore, since % is transitive and
x % y and y % z for all z ∈ B, it follows that x % z for all z ∈ B and hence x % z for
all z ∈ A ∪ B. Thus, A4 also holds. 
Independence of the Axioms
Let X = {w, x, y, z} and M = {A : A ⊆ X, A 6= ∅}. Each of the examples below
presents a set of choices from elements of M that satisfy all but one of A1–A4.
Not A1
C({w}) = {w}, C({x}) = {x}, C({y}) = {y}, C({z}) = {z}
C({w, x}) = {w, x}, C({w, y}) = {w}, C({w, z}) = ∅, C({x, y}) = C({x, z}) = {x}, C({y, z}) = ∅
C({w, x, y}) = {w, x}, C({w, x, z}) = {x}, C({w, y, z}) = ∅, C({x, y, z}) = {x}
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C({w, x, y, z}) = {x}
Not A2
C({w}) = {w}, C({x}) = {x}, C({y}) = {y}, C({z}) = ∅
C({w, x}) = {w, x}, C({w, y}) = {w}, C({w, z}) = ∅, C({x, y}) = {x}, C({x, z}) = C({y, z}) = ∅
C({w, x, y}) = {w, x}, C({w, x, z}) = C({w, y, z}) = C({x, y, z}) = ∅
C({w, x, y, z}) = ∅
Not A3
C({w}) = {w}, C({x}) = {x}, C({y}) = {y}, C({z}) = {z}
C({w, x}) = ∅, C({w, y}) = C({w, z}) = {w}, C({x, y}) = C({x, z}) = C({y, z}) = ∅
C({w, x, y}) = {w, x}, C({w, x, z}) = ∅, C({w, y, z}) = {w}, C({x, y, z}) = ∅
C({w, x, y, z}) = {w, x}
Not A4
C({w}) = {w}, C({x}) = {x}, C({y}) = {y}, C({z}) = {z}
C({w, x}) = C({w, y}) = C({w, z}) = {w}, C({x, y}) = C({x, z}) = C({y, z}) = ∅
C({w, x, y}) = {w}, C({w, x, z}) = C({w, y, z}) = C({x, y, z}) = ∅
C({w, x, y, z}) = ∅
Proof of Proposition 3.
Define ψ
%
(·) by
ψ
%
(A) =


c
∅
, if A = ∅
|A| −max
z∈A
|L
%
(z) ∩ A|, if A 6= ∅
where c∅ ≥ 0 is a constant and L%(z) := {y ∈ X : z % y for all y ∈ X}. Clearly, for
A 6= ∅, |A| = maxz∈A |L%(z)∩A| if and only if there exists z ∈ A such that L%(z) = A,
which is equivalent to z ∈ B
%
(A) 6= ∅. 
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Appendix 2: Instructions in Non-Forced Choice Treatment
General procedure
This experiment aims to study people’s choice behaviour. The choice objects will be 5 headphone sets
(HSs).
At the start of the experiment you will be allocated £7. You will then be presented with a sequence of 31
menus of HSs (a menu is simply a collection of HSs). Each menu may have 1 to 5 HSs. When a menu appears
on your screen you will have the opportunity to look at the image of each HS in that menu and also to read
a short description of its main features. You will then be able to choose one of the available HSs, or to select
the option “I’m not choosing now”.
You may spend as much time as you want at each menu before deciding what to do. You will see each menu
once, and when you proceed to the next menu you will not be able to go back.
After you have seen all 31 menus, one of them will be picked at random (each menu has a 1/31 chance
of being selected). You will be reminded of your original decision in this menu (henceforth menu R).
You will then get to examine the actual HSs contained in menu R and to try them while listening to a song.
Lastly, you will be asked to make a final choice from R (not choosing a HS is not possible at this stage).
One in every four participants will be randomly selected to win the HS of their final choice from their
randomly selected menu R.
Payment rules (Please also look at examples in separate sheet)
If you have not been selected to win a HS, you will be paid the £7 initially allocated to you.
If you have been selected to win a HS, the following rules apply regarding your payment:
A) Suppose that when you first saw menu R you had chosen some HS from it. If you chose the same
the second time, you will receive the £7 initially allocated to you.
B) Suppose that when you first saw menu R you had chosen some HS from it. If you chose a different
one the second time, you will receive £3 of the £7 initially allocated to you.
C) Suppose that when you first saw menu R you had chosen “I’m not choosing now”. Then, independent
of what you chose from that menu the second time, you will receive £6 of the £7 initially allocated to
you.
Special remarks about menus with two HSs (Please also look at examples in separate
sheet)
During the phase when you are presented with the 31 menus, whenever a menu of exactly two HSs
comes up and you have chosen one of them, a short follow-up question will ask you to state if you
preferred the chosen HS over the non-chosen one, or if the non-chosen one was equally good to the one you
chose (and therefore you chose randomly between them). If you have chosen “I’m not choosing now”
in such a menu, the question will ask you if this was because both HSs were equally good or because you
could not decide which one you preferred, or due to some other reason.
If your randomly selected menu R contains two HSs and you had previously stated that both were equally
good, then:
1) If you had chosen a headset from R initially, you will not be able to change your decision at this stage.
One of the two HS will be randomly selected and you will win this HS if you are picked as a winner.
2) If you had chosen “I’m not choosing now” at R initially, then one of the two HSs will be randomly selected
and you will win this HS if you are picked as a winner.
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Appendix 3: Instructions in Forced Choice Treatment
General procedure
This experiment aims to study people’s choice behaviour. The choice objects will be 5 headphone sets
(HSs).
At the start of the experiment you will be allocated £7. You will then be presented with a sequence of 31
menus of HSs (a menu is simply a collection of HSs). Each menu may have 1 to 5 HSs. When a menu appears
on your screen you will have the opportunity to look at the image of each HS in that menu and also to read
a short description of its main features. You will then be asked to choose one of the available HSs.
You may spend as much time as you want at each menu before deciding what to do. You will see each menu
once, and when you proceed to the next menu you will not be able to go back.
After you have seen all 31 menus, one of them will be picked at random (each menu has a 1/31 chance
of being selected). You will be reminded of your original decision in this menu (henceforth menu R).
You will then get to examine the actual HSs contained in menu R and to try them while listening to a song.
Lastly, you will be asked to make a final choice from R. One in every four participants will be randomly
selected to win the HS of their final choice from their randomly selected menu R.
Payment rules (Please also look at examples in separate sheet)
If you have not been selected to win a HS, you will be paid the £7 initially allocated to you.
If you have been selected to win a HS, the following rules apply regarding your payment:
A) Suppose that when you first saw menu R you had chosen some HS “aaa” from it. If you chose the
same menu the second time, you will receive the £7 initially allocated to you.
B) Suppose that when you first saw menu R you had chosen some HS “aaa” from it. If you chose a
different one the second time, you will receive £3 of the £7 initially allocated to you.
Special remarks about menus with two HSs (Please also look at example in separate
sheet)
During the phase when you are presented with the 31 menus, whenever a menu of exactly two HSs comes
up and you have chosen one of them, a short follow-up question will ask you to state if you preferred the
chosen HS over the non-chosen one, or if the non-chosen one was equally good to the one you chose (and
therefore you chose randomly between them).
If your randomly selected menu R contains two HSs and you had previously stated that both were equally good,
then you will not be able to change your decision at this stage. One of the two HS will be randomly selected
and you will win this HS if you are picked as a winner.
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Appendix 4: Sample Screenshots
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Appendix 5: Indecisive Personality Questionnaire
In the remaining questions you will be presented with a series of statements. You will be asked to state
to what extent you agree with these statements by choosing on a scale from 0 (“strongly disagree”) to 7
(“strongly agree”).
1) I find it easy to make decisions.
2) It is hard for me to make a decision.
3) I don’t know how to make decisions.
4) I know which steps to take when making a decision.
5) I would characterize myself as an indecisive person.
6) I don’t hesitate much when I have to make a decision.
7) While making a decision, I feel certain.
8) While making a decision, I feel uncertain.
9) It takes a long time to weigh the pros and cons when making a decision.
10) I make decisions quickly.
11) I delay deciding.
12) I don’t postpone making decisions to a later date.
13) I try to avoid making a decision.
14) I don’t avoid situations where decisions have to be made.
15) I tend to leave decisions to someone else.
16) I cut the knot myself in a decision instead of leaving the decision to others.
17) Once I have taken a decision, I stick to that decision.
18) I often reconsider my decision.
19) Once I have made a decision, I stop worrying about it.
20) After making a decision, I can’t get it out of my mind.
21) After I have decided something, I believe I took the wrong decision.
22) After making a decision, I don’t regret the decision.
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